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Congress and the executive branch have shown an ex-
traordinary tendency in recent years to entrust numerous thorny
problems to the members of their sister branch of government,
the federal judiciary. From the federalizing of crimes tradition-
ally viewed as the province of the state criminal justice systems,
to the appointment of special prosecutors and the creation of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, judges appointed pursuant to
Article III of the Constitution are increasingly called upon to
perform functions beyond decision-making in federal cases and
controversies.' International affairs are not immune from this
approach to problem-solving employed by the first two branches
of our tri-partite government. Indeed, international trade has
been, and probably will be into the next century, a prominent
area for non-traditional, perhaps extra-constitutional, uses of Ar-
ticle III judges.
Utilization of Article III judges for other than the exercise
of the judicial power of the United States is not new. In In re
* H.L Mencken is reputed to have once observed: "Every complex problem has a
simple solution and it's usually wrong." See, e.g., United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252,
264 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); Andrew R. Simmonds et al., Dealing
with Anomalies, Confusion and Contradiction in Fraud on the Market Securities Class Actions,
81 Ky. L.J. 123 (1993).
** Judge, U.S. Court of International Trade.
*** Professor of Political Science, Lehman College of The City University of New
York.
1. Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads as follows:
SECTION 2. Thejudicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority,-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State
and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States,-be-
tween Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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President's Commission on Organized Crime,2 the court highlighted
the policy concerns caused by judicial membership on the Presi-
dent's Commission, and reviewed some of the notable instances
of similar service. In an early example, President Grant ap-
pointed Justice Samuel Nelson to represent the United States in
arbitration of Great Britain's claims in 1871.1 Justice Robert
Jackson served as chief prosecutor at the Nuremburg trials, and
Chief Justice Earl Warren headed the commission investigating
the assassination of President Kennedy.4 The list is a good deal
longer, but ChiefJustice Warren himself, in explaining his origi-
nal declination, pointed out some of the obvious concerns:
I told [Deputy Attorney General] Katzenbach and [Solicitor
General] Cox that I had more than once expressed myself to
that effect for several reasons. First, it is not in the spirit of
constitutional separation of powers to have a member of the
Supreme Court serve on a presidential commission; second, it
would distract a Justice from the work of the Court, which
had a heavy docket; and, third, it was impossible to foresee
what litigation such a commission might spawn, with resulting
disqualification of the Justice from sitting in such cases. I
then told them that, historically, the acceptance of diplomatic
posts by Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth, had not contributed
to the welfare of the Court, that the service of five Justices on
the Hayes-Tilden Commission had demeaned it, that the ap-
pointment of Justice Roberts as chairman to investigate the
Pearl Harbor disaster had served no good purpose, and that
the action of Justice Robert Jackson in leaving Court for a
year to become chief prosecutor at Nfirnburg after World
War II had resulted in divisiveness and internal bitterness on
the Court.'
Interestingly, this passage was quoted by the court in Mistretta v.
United States,6 which upheld perhaps the most controversial use
of Article III judges in recent history, that is, as members of the
United States Sentencing Commission. The issue of nonjudicial
activity was also taken up by the Senate in a 1947 report by the
Senate Judiciary Committee:
2. 783 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding Judge Irving Kaufman's participation
thereon constitutional).
3. Id. at 377 n.4.
4. Id. at 377.
5. EARL WAREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIE JUsTICE EARL WARREN 356 (1977).
6. 488 U.S. 361, 401 n.26 (1989).
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When historical precedent is examined, it appears that the
practice of using Federal judges in nonjudicial capacities has
been defended in some quarters and strongly disapproved in
others. A dearth of capable men in the early public life of the
Nation gave rise to the frequent use of judges in nonjudicial
activities, but objections to the practice were voiced by many,
including Jefferson, Madison, and Pinckney. It was said that
the choice of Federal judges for nonjudicial duties made the
bench an 'annex' of a political party and an 'auxiliary' to the
Executive. The situation was criticized as 'unwise and degrad-
ing. 7
As further historical examples of extrajudicial service
demonstrate, the international arena is a prime target for the
"Article III solution." Justice Owen Roberts served on the Com-
mission to investigate the bombing of Pearl Harbor.' Chief Jus-
tice Melville Fuller and Justice David Brewer arbitrated a bound-
ary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana.9 Justice
Charles Evans Hughes settled a border dispute between Guate-
mala and Honduras, and Justice Willis Van Devanter arbitrated a
dispute with Great Britain over a vessel seizure.'0
Moving forward to recent times, the conscription of Article
III judges to resolve international trade disputes appears to be
on the upswing. Binational and regional free trade agreements
are becoming a popular device to resolve international trade
woes." A feature of the most well-known of the regional agree-
ments, the North American Free Trade Agreement
12
("NAFTA"), and its predecessor, the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement,' 3 is the creation of the binational dispute set-
tlement panels to resolve antidumping and countervailing duty
disputes. NAFTA, however, contains a new provision. The
panels that are normally composed of lawyers in the interna-
tional trade field, often the very lawyers who litigate against each
7. S. REP. No. 7, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947) (footnote omitted).
8. In re President's Comm'n, 783 F.2d at 377.
9. Id. at n.4.
10. Id.
11. These types of agreements are to be distinguished from the broad-based multi-
lateral agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and
its successor, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
12. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296, 605 (en-
tered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
13. Jan. 2, 1988, Ch. 19, 27 I.L.M. 281, 286.
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other and who appear before the panels,14 are to be joined by
judges within the federal judicial circuits. 5 The selection pro-
cess for the particular panels is not unlike that utilized under the
rules of the American Arbitration Association.16
The drafters of the NAFTA Implementation Act did per-
ceive some of the special problems caused by the utilization of
such odd creatures as Article III judges. The statute thus estab-
lishes procedures for selection of judges and placement on a list
of candidates eligible for service, which differ from those appli-
cable to other candidates. These procedures are set forth in Sec-
tion 402 of the implementing legislation. 7
First, the U.S. Trade Representative must consult with the
chief judges of the federal judicial circuits to determine who is
interested and who is available for service on the binational
panels, extraordinary challenge committees (appeals panels for
narrow governmental challenges),"8 and special committees.19 If
a chiefjudge of the circuit unearths (or unbenches) a likely can-
didate, the name of the candidate is presented to the Chief Jus-
tice of the United States, who may submit the name or names to
the Trade Representative, who, in turn, "shall" include the
names submitted on the roster of judges.20 The roster is then
submitted for consultation to the House and Senate Committees
on the Judiciary, the House Ways and Means Committee, and
the Senate Finance Committee.21 A final list is then submitted
14. This may be one of the reasons why participation by members of the judiciary
is desired. The involved attorneys are not always comfortable with the judgments, and
the process of being judged, by their colleagues. See Robert E. Burke & Brian F. Walsh,
NAFTA Binational Panel Review: Should It Be Continued, Eliminated or Substantially
Changed?, 20 BROOK J. INT'L L. 529, 560-61 (1995). Ethical issues also have arisen. See
id. at 556-58 (discussing conflicts of interest raised in In re Certain Softwood Lumber Prods.
from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01USA (Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Proceeding,
Aug. 3, 1994)).
15. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
182, tit. IV, § 402, 107 Stat. 2057, 2130 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3432(b) (2) (Supp. V
1993)).
16. See, e.g., AMERiCAN ArTRATiON ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
RuL.zs arts. 5-6 (1993); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
RULES rules 4, 13 (1993).
17. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 3432(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1994) with 19 U.S.C. § 3432(c)
(1988 & Supp. V 1994).
18. See NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 3432(b) (2).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 3432(b)(3).
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by the Trade Representative to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee and the Senate Finance Committee.22
Second, pursuant to Annex 1901.2 of NAFTA, Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States consult and draw up a roster of 75
candidates for binational panels from their respective lists.
23
Each party to a dispute selects two candidates from the roster.
24
Four peremptory challenges are allowed, and the fifth candidate
is chosen by agreement of the parties. 25 Falling agreement, the
fifth panelist is chosen by lot from the roster.2 6 NAFTA specifi-
cally provides that judges and former judges shall be used to the
fullest extent possible.27 Further, for purposes of an appeal, an
extraordinary challenge committee is to be selected from a ros-
ter comprised only of judges and former judges of the federal
benches of the three countries. 28 The committee would consist
of three members.'
Third, issues regarding the integrity of the dispute settle-
ment system are to be resolved by special committees, appointed
from the same roster and in the same manner as the extraordi-
nary challenge committee. To date, however, the Chief Justice
has approved no names for the Trade Representative's lists of
candidates for any of the NAFIA dispute resolution functions.
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") has occasioned
another proposal for the use of Article IIIjudges in international
trade dispute resolution, outside the sphere of "Cases" or "Con-
troversies." Debate regarding passage of the Uruguay Round Im-
plementation Act included discussion of concerns as to loss of
sovereignty, because, in general, domestic law prior to 194730 is
not shielded from WTO violation, as was the case formerly with
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). Fur-
22. Id. § 3432(b)(3), (c)(4).
23. NAFTA, supra note 12, annex 1901.2(1), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
24. Id. annex 1901.2(2), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
25. Id. annex 1901.2(2)-(3), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
26. Id. annex 1901.2(2), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
27. Id. annex 1901.2(1), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
28. Id. annex 1904.13(1), 32 I.L.M. at 688.
29. Id. art. 1905(2), (4)-(5), 32 I.L.M. at 684.
30. GATT was signed on October 30, 1947. GAT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.IAS. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
31. Under the WTO system, GATT will be applied definitively and the exception
for "grandfathered" legislation will be eliminated, subject to a limited exemption in the
1994 GATT text. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, annex IA, 1 3, 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1155.
1995] QUICK SOLUTION TO COMPLEX PROBLEMS
thermore, WTO panel decisions are to be more binding than
past GATT decisions.32 To assuage such concerns, Senate Major-
ity Leader Robert Dole has introduced Senate Bill 16, the WTO
Dispute Settlement Review Commission Act (the "Dole Legisla-
tion") .3 The review commission to be established is to be com-
posed of five active circuit judges who are to be appointed by the
President, after consultation with the Congressional leadership,
for terms of two to five years.3 4 The purpose of the commission
is to review the decisions of the WTO resolving disputes between
member nations, for both substantive and procedural fairness,
and to report to Congress regarding the effects of the decisions
on the rights of the United States.35 The reports may lead to a
joint resolution of Congress calling for negotiation by the Presi-
dent to improve the WTO dispute settlement procedures or a
joint resolution of Congress to withdraw from the WTO.3 6
One of the interesting features of this proposed legislation
is that it provides no role for any segment of the Article III gov-
ernance structure in the selection of the judges who would be
appointed. Thus, despite workloads or the press of the responsi-
bility of exercising the judicial power of the United States, indi-
vidual judges would be selected directly by the President for this
duty. Presumably, ajudge may decline. The provision for direct
presidential selection would seem to be an unusual and unwise
interference with the self-governance of a coordinate branch of
government. Contrast the NAFTA procedures discussed above
and the selection procedures for the judicial members of the
United States Sentencing Commission 37 with Senate Bill 16. The
need for the judiciary to be involved in the assignment of its own
judges is an inherent aspect of its independence. James
Madison wrote that "neither of [the Branches] ought to possess
directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in
the administration of their respective powers."38 The constitu-
32. See id. annex 2, arts. 3, 17, 21, 33 1.L.M. at 1227, 1236, 1238.
33. S. 16, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
34. Id. § 3.
35. Id. § 4.
36. Id. § 6.
37. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 991(a), at least three of the eight members of the
Sentencing Commission must be judges, chosen from a list of six judges recommended
by the Judicial Conference to the President. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
38. THE FEDERALsIT No. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
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tionality of the NAFTA legislation and of Senate Bill 16, if it is
enacted, will no doubt be the subject of legal decision, 9 as
NAFTA is now of law review articles.'
Here, rather, we address the policy considerations of involv-
ing the federal judiciary in the extrajudicial resolution and re-
view of international trade disputes. First, having "no influence
over either the sword or the purse,"41 the judicial branch de-
pends upon its perceived legitimacy for the acceptance of and
adherence to its decisions.4 2 Acceptance and adherence by the
coordinate branches, the states, the lower federal courts, and the
public, in turn, enables the judiciary to fulfill its role in the con-
stitutional structure. Indeed, as the Mistretta opinion forth-
rightly declares, "[t] he legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ulti-
mately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonparti-
sanship."43
The court in Mistretta noted that:
According to express provision of Article III, the judicial
power of the United States is limited to 'Cases' and 'Contro-
versies' . . . . These doctrines help to ensure the indepen-
dence of the Judicial Branch by precluding debilitating entan-
glements between the Judiciary and the two political
Branches.44
Also, as Judge J. Skelly Wright, in part quoting Chief Judge Car-
dozo, observed:
Most critically, public confidence in the judiciary is indispens-
able to the operation of the law; yet this quality is placed in
risk whenever judges step outside the courtroom into the vor-
39. Such an action was brought in the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia challenging the decision in Certain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Canada, ECC 94-1904-
01USA (Aug. 3, 1994). Coalition For Fair Lumber Imports v. United States, No. 94-
1627 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 14, 1994) (appeal voluntarily dismissedJan. 6, 1995).
40. See, e.g., Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Constitutional Dimensions of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 141 (likening binational panel decision-
making to unconstitutional exercise of judicial power of United States by Article I
court); see also Burke & Walsh, supra note 14.
41. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
42. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814-16 (1992)
(holding that overruling of prior precedent would not only reach unjustifiable result
under stare decisis principles, but would seriously weaken Court capacity to exercise judi-
cial power and function as Court of nation dedicated to rule of law).
43. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989).
44. Id. at 385 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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tex of political activity. Judges should be saved 'from the en-
tanglements, at times the partisan suspicions, so often the re-
sult of other and conflicting duties.'45
The Dole Legislation particularly threatens to involve the judici-
ary in debate among the Congress, the President, and the public
as to whether membership in the WTO invades the sovereignty
of the United States, a subject that arouses great passions and
that surely will not keep the judiciary above the fray of political
issues. It also leaves open the possibility that the President's se-
lection for the WTO review commission could be attacked as
partisan or politically-motivated, thus drawing the nominated
judges into political controversies. Moreover, the breadth of the
review may lead the five judges into making political rather than
judicial judgements. 6
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in discussing the federali-
zation of crimes in his ninth annual year-end report, stated:
Congress, of course, is subject to the limits imposed by the
Constitution in enacting legislation. And in Hayburn's Case,
decided in the first decade of the Nation's existence, the
Supreme Court held that Congress could not require federal
courts to decide cases which were then subject to revision by
some agency outside thejudiciary. But subject to these limita-
tions, the law which Congress declares is the law which the
federal courts apply.47
45. Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 923 (D.D.C. 1967) (Wright, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401, 420 (1928)).
46. A similar situation was presented in Morrison v. O/soii, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
There the court upheld the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978, permitting the appointment of independent counsel by a "Special
Division" court of Article III judges (also created by the Act). 487 U.S. at 696-97. Yet, a
recent appointment has engendered questions about the impartiality and nonpartisan-
ship of three Article III judges acting in such a capacity. See In re Charge of Judicial
Misconduct or Disability, Judicial Council Complaint Nos. 94-8, 94-9, 94-10, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 30631 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1994) (dismissing complaint).
Judge Edwards discussed the effect of involvement in non-judicial functions upon
the perceived integrity and nonpartisanship of the judiciary. Id. at *18-*24. He found
that the Special Division was not exercising Article III judicial power and that "[ilt
makes little sense to think that an authority acting pursuant to the Appointment Clause
of Article II might be forbidden from consulting with others" [allegedly including U.S.
Senators]. Id. at *21. Yet "[e]ven when acting in his capacity as a member of the Spe-
cial Division, the judge... may still be subject to disciplinary process in this circuit by
virtue of his service as judge of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit." Id. at *13.
Upon what criteria then are non-judicial or political actions of a judge to be weighed?
47. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, ChiefJustice Rehnquist Reflects on 1994 in Year-
End Report, THmiw BRANCH, Jan. 1995, at 2.
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Certainly, whatever the application of Hayburn's Case" to such
extra-judicial decision-making, NAFTA panel decisions are arbi-
tral,49 and opinions under Senate Bill 16 are advisory and possess
no finality. Participation in the issuance of such opinions does
not contribute to traditional notions of the role of Article III
adjudication. Arguably, the participating judges would not be
exercising judicial power in these capacities and thus, under the
doctrine of United States v. Ferreira,5" would be acting as "commis-
sioners" rather than as judges. The proposed creation in Senate
Bill 16 of a commission composed only of five active circuit
judges and of the extraordinary challenge committee in NAFMA,
composed only ofjudges and former judges, however, are delib-
erately designed to look remarkably like U.S. federal courts.
Structures that effectively mimic Article III courts may not fall
within the Ferreira exception to the principles set forth by the
justices deciding Hayburn's Case.
Third, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges,5"
promulgated by the Judicial Conference,5 2 might be read to re-
quire federal judges to decline service on these bodies. Canon 5
states: "A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to mini-
mize the risk of conflict with judicial duties." Subsection G of
Canon 5 reads as follows:
A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental
committee, commission, or other position that is concerned
with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the im-
provement of the law, the legal system, or the administration
ofjustice, unless appointment of ajudge is required by Act of
Congress. A judge should not, in any event, accept such an ap-
pointment if the judge's governmental duties would interfere with the
performance ofjudicial duties or tend to undermine the integrity, im-
48. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (finding power of Congress to assign duties to Fed-
eral Judiciary limited to judicial duties only).
49. Under an unusual provision of the United States Code, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(g)(7) (Supp. V 1993), the President may accept a NAFTA panel decision,
whether or not it is found to be constitutional.
50. 40 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 48 (1851) (finding power conferred upon district court
judge by statute similar to that of commissioner appointed to adjust claims to land or
money under treaty).
51. 2 GUIDE TOJUDICIAL POuCES AND PROCEDURES, CODES OF CONDUCT FORJUDGES
AND JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES (Oct. 1994).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). The Judicial Conference is to serve as the principal
policy-making body concerned with the administration of U.S. Courts. Id.
1995] QUICK SOLUTION TO COMPLEX PROBLEMS
partiality, or independence of the judiciary.53
The commentary to Canon 5G, which offers significant observa-
tions, states:
Valuable services have been rendered in the past to the states
and the nation by judges appointed by the executive to un-
dertake important extra-judicial assignments. The appropri-
ateness of conferring these assignments on judges must be
reassessed, however, in light of the demands on judicial re-
sources created by today's crowded dockets and the need to
protect the courts from involvement in extra-judicial matters
that may prove to be controversial. Judges should not be ex-
pected or permitted to accept governmental appointments
that could interfere with the effectiveness and independence
of the judiciary. The dangers attendant upon acceptance of
extra-judicial governmental assignments are ordinarily less se-
rious where the appointment of a judge is required by legisla-
tion. Such assignments ordinarily do not involve excessive
commitments of time, and they typically do not pose a serious
threat to the independence of the judiciary .... A code of
conduct ought not compel judges to refuse, without regard to
the circumstances, tasks Congress has seen fit to authorize as
appropriate in the public interest. Although legislatively pre-
scribed extra-judicial assignments should be discouraged,
where Congress requires the appointment of a judge to per-
form extra-judicial duties, the judge may accept the appoint-
ment provided that the judge's services would not interfere with the
performance of the judge's judicial responsibilities or tend to under-
mine public confidence in the judiciary.M
The individual judges selected, or those in the judiciary re-
sponsible for approving their selection, will have to decide if ser-
vice on the bodies at issue will unduly interfere with the respon-
sibilities of the particular judge to exercise the judicial power of
the United States, will involve the judiciary in matters which will
not enhance the public's view of judges as impartial and appro-
priately uninvolved decision-makers, or will violate the constitu-
tional principles underlying Hayburn's Case.
53. CODES OF CONDUGr FOR JUDGES, supra note 51, Canon 5G (emphasis added).
54. Id. Canon 5G commentary (emphasis added). Also established by Congress,
the Judicial Conference can be characterized as the paramount commission within the
judicial branch. As the principal policy-making body concerned with the administra-
tion of the U.S. Courts, its "Commentary," with its constitutional separation of powers
base, should be given great weight. Id.
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The writers hereof, speaking only for themselves, do not ap-
plaud continuation of this trend in international trade law into
the "twenty-first century." We look forward to its reconsidera-
tion.
